Knowledge as a graph. The idea that knowledge has a graph structure has deep roots in epistemology and philosophy of science. Debate over how justification is structured has long set foundationalist hierarchies against coherentist webs (Sosa 1980). Thagard’s theory of explanatory coherence (1989) made this idea computational: propositions become nodes, explanatory relations become links, and which beliefs to accept is decided by the network as a whole.
What makes an explanation good. Accounts of what makes an explanation good also lend themselves to graphs. On the unificationist view, explanatory power comes from deriving many results from a few shared patterns (Kitcher 1981). Other accounts tie explanation to causal or constitutive dependence, which can be modeled with directed graphs and structural equations (Pearl 2009; Woodward 2003; Halpern & Pearl 2005; Schaffer 2016). Still others ask for an explanation that keeps only the factors that make a difference (Strevens 2008) and is hard to vary (Deutsch 2011).
How understanding is built. Learning theory, for its part, has shown that understanding is built along prerequisite hierarchies (Gagné 1968), and it has formalized such structures combinatorially (Doignon & Falmagne 1999) and in concept maps used for teaching (Novak & Gowin 1984).
Knowen. Taken together, this work suggests that a body of scientific knowledge could be organized as a directed acyclic graph of self-contained explanations. Each node would be understandable from its ancestors, shared foundations would appear once and be reused, and new results would attach at the right depth. Knowen was conceived as exactly this kind of structure, but building and maintaining such graphs by hand is very labor-intensive. Large language models make it practical, for the first time, to test the idea at scale: we can generate explanation DAGs from papers and whole bodies of literature, and then measure how well they serve both learners and researchers (see Growing a graph from many sources).
References
Deutsch, D. (2011). The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World. Viking, New York.
Gagné, R. M. (1968). Learning hierarchies. Educational Psychologist, 6(1), 1–9.
Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005). Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part II: Explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(4), 889–911.
Kitcher, P. (1981). Explanatory unification. Philosophy of Science, 48(4), 507–531.
Novak, J. D., & Gowin, D. B. (1984). Learning How to Learn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pearl, J. (2009). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. Philosophical Studies, 173(1), 49–100.
Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid: Coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 3–26.
Strevens, M. (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(3), 435–502.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, New York.
**Knowledge as a graph.** The idea that knowledge has a graph structure has deep roots in epistemology and philosophy of science. Debate over how justification is structured has long set foundationalist hierarchies against coherentist webs (Sosa 1980). Thagard’s theory of explanatory coherence (1989) made this idea computational: propositions become nodes, explanatory relations become links, and which beliefs to accept is decided by the network as a whole.
**What makes an explanation good.** Accounts of what makes an explanation good also lend themselves to graphs. On the unificationist view, explanatory power comes from deriving many results from a few shared patterns (Kitcher 1981). Other accounts tie explanation to causal or constitutive dependence, which can be modeled with directed graphs and structural equations (Pearl 2009; Woodward 2003; Halpern & Pearl 2005; Schaffer 2016). Still others ask for an explanation that keeps only the factors that make a difference (Strevens 2008) and is hard to vary (Deutsch 2011).
**How understanding is built.** Learning theory, for its part, has shown that understanding is built along prerequisite hierarchies (Gagné 1968), and it has formalized such structures combinatorially (Doignon & Falmagne 1999) and in concept maps used for teaching (Novak & Gowin 1984).
**Knowen.** Taken together, this work suggests that a body of scientific knowledge could be organized as a directed acyclic graph of self-contained explanations. Each node would be understandable from its ancestors, shared foundations would appear once and be reused, and new results would attach at the right depth. Knowen was conceived as exactly this kind of structure, but building and maintaining such graphs by hand is very labor-intensive. Large language models make it practical, for the first time, to test the idea at scale: we can generate explanation DAGs from papers and whole bodies of literature, and then measure how well they serve both learners and researchers (see [Growing a graph from many sources](/nodes/29550)).
**References**
- Deutsch, D. (2011). *The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World.* Viking, New York.
- Doignon, J.-P., & Falmagne, J.-C. (1999). *Knowledge Spaces.* Springer, Berlin.
- Gagné, R. M. (1968). Learning hierarchies. *Educational Psychologist,* 6(1), 1–9.
- Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005). Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part II: Explanations. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,* 56(4), 889–911.
- Kitcher, P. (1981). Explanatory unification. *Philosophy of Science,* 48(4), 507–531.
- Novak, J. D., & Gowin, D. B. (1984). *Learning How to Learn.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Pearl, J. (2009). *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference* (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. *Philosophical Studies,* 173(1), 49–100.
- Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid: Coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* 5, 3–26.
- Strevens, M. (2008). *Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences,* 12(3), 435–502.
- Woodward, J. (2003). *Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.* Oxford University Press, New York.